MLUG: Re: [MLUG] Diebold demands that HBO cancel documentary on votingmachines
Re: [MLUG] Diebold demands that HBO cancel documentary on votingmachines
Email address obfuscation in effect -- please click here to turn it off.

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Too late for tomorrow, but I guess a grassroots solution would be to get out the absentee vote. Those are all scanned bubble-sheets, I think, and a sharp rise in absentee voting would surely send a message to local election boards, although not without its own accountability issues. Probably there already is such a movement; I'm only up on the problems, not the solutions <sigh>.
Dave


Fallert, Adam Christian wrote:
I say let software of this nature be open source.  No better way to
ensure top security than by letting the geeks of the world hammer on it.

-----Original Message-----
From: EMAIL:PROTECTED
[mailto:EMAIL:PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Mike Miller
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 5:11 PM
To: MLUG Members
Subject: Re: [MLUG] Diebold demands that HBO cancel documentary on
votingmachines

On Mon, 6 Nov 2006, Dave McBride wrote:

I couldn't agree more with your concerns. It's odd (sad?), though,
that
for all I've heard about this problem, I haven't heard it proposed
that
we look at open source as part of the solution, until now.

It has been proposed before. But you know how open source works -- they

have a limited marketing/advertising budget!


Last week I heard an interview that included the Marketing Dir. of Diebold. His main proof that the machines were good seemed to be that they are used in a lot of jurisdictions. He also pointed out that the

computer scientists had got hold of a machine that they had no
business
having (he wanted to know the name of the person who got it for them),

and used it to conduct some very dubious hacks that were not at all relevant for a Real-World polling place full of observant election officials and security personnel.

To quote Dave Barry, I'm not making this up. http://www.wamu.org/programs/dr/06/10/30.php#11767

I saw that guy on some news show recently, maybe PBS Newshour. The researcher was a comp sci professor at Princeton. Oh - here it is:


http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec06/electronic_11-02.html

Check that out. They have streaming video so that you can watch (er, supposedly, but it didn't work correctly for me, but they have a full transcript).

They don't really explain it in the program, but the major problem with the Diebold approach to security (let the local jurisdiction deal with
it) is that we as voters don't know that the machine is really being handled


correctly and carefully. It would be expensive to hire round-the-clock guards and to put the machines into safes, etc., so you know they are never going to be all that secure.

I think we need to scrap this machine-based approach altogether and
stick with paper. Machines could be used as aids to voters who have problems with normal paper ballots, but those machines would then print out something for the voter to use. In the end, paper should be scanned and


the paper should be retained for future use, in case the result is questionable.

Mike

_______________________________________________
members mailing list
EMAIL:PROTECTED
http://mlug.missouri.edu/mailman/listinfo/members

_______________________________________________
members mailing list
EMAIL:PROTECTED
http://mlug.missouri.edu/mailman/listinfo/members


_______________________________________________ members mailing list EMAIL:PROTECTED http://mlug.missouri.edu/mailman/listinfo/members