RE: [MLUG] Diebold demands that HBO cancel documentary on votingmachines

["Fallert, Adam Christian" <EMAIL:PROTECTED>]

I say let software of this nature be open source.  No better way to
ensure top security than by letting the geeks of the world hammer on it.

-----Original Message-----
From: EMAIL:PROTECTED
[mailto:EMAIL:PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Mike Miller
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 5:11 PM
To: MLUG Members
Subject: Re: [MLUG] Diebold demands that HBO cancel documentary on
votingmachines

On Mon, 6 Nov 2006, Dave McBride wrote:

> I couldn't agree more with your concerns. It's odd (sad?), though,
that 
> for all I've heard about this problem, I haven't heard it proposed
that 
> we look at open source as part of the solution, until now.

It has been proposed before.  But you know how open source works -- they

have a limited marketing/advertising budget!


> Last week I heard an interview that included the Marketing Dir. of 
> Diebold. His main proof that the machines were good seemed to be that 
> they are used in a lot of jurisdictions.  He also pointed out that the

> computer scientists had got hold of a machine that they had no
business 
> having (he wanted to know the name of the person who got it for them),

> and used it to conduct some very dubious hacks that were not at all 
> relevant for a Real-World polling place full of observant election 
> officials and security personnel.
>
> To quote Dave Barry, I'm not making this up. 
> http://www.wamu.org/programs/dr/06/10/30.php#11767

I saw that guy on some news show recently, maybe PBS Newshour.  The 
researcher was a comp sci professor at Princeton.  Oh - here it is:

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec06/electronic_11-02.html

Check that out.  They have streaming video so that you can watch (er, 
supposedly, but it didn't work correctly for me, but they have a full 
transcript).

They don't really explain it in the program, but the major problem with 
the Diebold approach to security (let the local jurisdiction deal with
it) 
is that we as voters don't know that the machine is really being handled

correctly and carefully.  It would be expensive to hire round-the-clock 
guards and to put the machines into safes, etc., so you know they are 
never going to be all that secure.

I think we need to scrap this machine-based approach altogether and
stick 
with paper.  Machines could be used as aids to voters who have problems 
with normal paper ballots, but those machines would then print out 
something for the voter to use.  In the end, paper should be scanned and

the paper should be retained for future use, in case the result is 
questionable.

Mike

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