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On Mon, 6 Nov 2006, Dave McBride wrote:
I couldn't agree more with your concerns. It's odd (sad?), though, that
for all I've heard about this problem, I haven't heard it proposed that
we look at open source as part of the solution, until now.
It has been proposed before. But you know how open source works -- they
have a limited marketing/advertising budget!
Last week I heard an interview that included the Marketing Dir. of
Diebold. His main proof that the machines were good seemed to be that
they are used in a lot of jurisdictions. He also pointed out that the
computer scientists had got hold of a machine that they had no business
having (he wanted to know the name of the person who got it for them),
and used it to conduct some very dubious hacks that were not at all
relevant for a Real-World polling place full of observant election
officials and security personnel.
To quote Dave Barry, I'm not making this up.
http://www.wamu.org/programs/dr/06/10/30.php#11767
I saw that guy on some news show recently, maybe PBS Newshour. The
researcher was a comp sci professor at Princeton. Oh - here it is:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec06/electronic_11-02.html
Check that out. They have streaming video so that you can watch (er,
supposedly, but it didn't work correctly for me, but they have a full
transcript).
They don't really explain it in the program, but the major problem with
the Diebold approach to security (let the local jurisdiction deal with it)
is that we as voters don't know that the machine is really being handled
correctly and carefully. It would be expensive to hire round-the-clock
guards and to put the machines into safes, etc., so you know they are
never going to be all that secure.
I think we need to scrap this machine-based approach altogether and stick
with paper. Machines could be used as aids to voters who have problems
with normal paper ballots, but those machines would then print out
something for the voter to use. In the end, paper should be scanned and
the paper should be retained for future use, in case the result is
questionable.
Mike
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