MLUG: Re: [MLUG - DISCUSSION] statistical inference
Re: [MLUG - DISCUSSION] statistical inference
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Mike Miller wrote:
On Fri, 2 Jun 2006, Stephen Montgomery-Smith wrote:

Here are two good books on inference:

Edwards AWF (1972) Likelihood. Cambridge University Press,London
Royall, R. (1997). Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm. London: Chapman & Hall


Here is a review by geneticist/statisticians:

http://taxa.epi.umn.edu/~mbmiller/journals/ajhg/199807_Vieland_Hodge_Likelihood.pdf (the first 7 pages of that PDF)

I read Edwards very thoroughly and thought he had great ideas. I haven't read Royall, but I think his ideas are much like those of Edwards.


I will try to read those books sometime. (I am also occupied with other projects, so it won't be too soon.)

But the opening lines of the PDF review tell me that the "best" statistical method is clearly up in the air. You happen to like Edwards' approach, but someone else might prefer something different.


Sort of. It really depends on the situation. I'm not always sure what drives arguments about "Bayesian" and "frequentist" perspectives on inference, but I think a lot of it is due to the fact that it is a difficult topic and a statistician can get by professionally without ever really coming to grips with the core philosophical problems.

My sense is that statistics as a field doesn't have the strong foundations that, say, math or physics has. I think this field needs a "Newton" to come along and sort it all out. But I also think that the time is ripe for this to happen, just like Einstein's theories were ripe for their time.



By the way, I see the "likelihood method" as an unweighted Baysian method i.e. assume that both options are equally likely in the prior distribution.


Sort of, but not quite. What Edwards points out is that the likelihood contains all the information about the parameters that can be found in the data. In a Bayesian analysis, one uses the likelihood along with a "prior" which is a sort of weighting scheme based on, well, based on whatever the hell you want it to be based on -- and that's the problem with Bayesian analysis, but that doesn't mean it isn't a good thing.

I'll have to look at it. But a problem with his scenario is that he is deciding between to possibilities p(1/2) and p(1/4). But really you would be deciding between all possible p between 0 and 1. Then the implicit assumption that all the priors are the same plays a much bigger role than you might think.


The problem that has driven my thinking is this one. Suppose you go out and capture 1000 birds. You observe 16 different species, but 5 of them you only observe once. Try to give a lower estimate on how many species you didn't observe. Note that 0 is quite unlikely, because 5 of the species are quite likely very sparse, and if there were only 5 of these sparse species, quite likely you wouldn't have observed them all.

This problem is obviously important to ecology and is well studied: http://viceroy.eeb.uconn.edu/EstimateS. Chao's work on this is quite brilliant, but is essentially ad-hoc. I tried a Baysian approach, and its dependence upon priors is tremendous, and in any case it always seem to estimate too high.

My thinking is that if you really study this model problem, then you have some hope of getting closer to what the foundations of statistics really should be. It is more difficult than the simple, model problems, but much easier than most real life problems (e.g. microarrays).


I do admit that I am not an expert in statistics, and my guess is that you and Jon know way more than I do. On the other hand I do think I know a great deal about probability. I recently saw an account of how mitochondrial DNA could be used as evidence that all the different types of ape (including the human being) must have a non-trivial tree of ancestry. Not being that familiar with statistics, I thought about why the test he chose (a chi-squared test) was appropriate, and I could see that it had many underlying assumptions, not all of which were reasonable - (in his case that evolutionary pressures might not cause a change in the DNA in one place to speed up changes in DNA in other positions). He computed an absurdly small p value, which meant that he could reject his null hypothesis. But it made me question the value of these tests in being able to produce absurdly small p values, because the assumptions he made, which were reasonable, nevertheless could be violated with a probability which, while small, were way bigger than the absurdly small p value he obtained. Thus he might still have a small p value, but perhaps more like 1% than .000000000000001% which was the kind of value he got.


It seems like you are understanding how the game is played. It's all about the assumptions. If you have a good model and reasonable assumptions, a statistical test can be extremely persuasive.

An awful lot of work in genetics has been done to show that violations of certain assumptions are not going to ruin a statistical test. Most of statistics is about approximation and extracting meaning and direction from data -- random data that includes all sorts of errors. We don't know that we are doing things the best way because we don't know the answers yet. There is a lot of guess work. But through all of this guessing and testing and approximating we find ways to advance knowledge and make progress. We've made huge strides in science and part of the reason is that statistical analysis provides an excellent way of telling when we have the wrong idea. By discovering which ideas are bad, we move forward.

I have a sense that this person was in denial about the problems I brought up. He told me emphatically that there was no reasonable reason to suppose that the changes in DNA were related to each other - but then in another email told me that changes in DNA are found NOT to be a Poisson process because the variance is about 2 times too big. These two statements contradict each other.



And 1%, while small, is not a kind of certainty that you want to have when you are trying to say "evolution is right and creationism is wrong."


But, of course, he wasn't testing that. I'm sure he was assuming that "evolution is right." My guess is that he didn't even mention creationism, probably because he wouldn't have any reason at this point, with all of his knowledge, even to consider the possibility that he should evoke a supernatural cause for anything he was studying.

This discussion took place in the context of evolution versus creationism.

Now this "randomization" process you described is an attempt to push the experiment into the highly controled scenario in which we have been so successful in computing probabilities of getting good poker hands. But I question our ability to perform this randomization with any certainty when we are dealing with data like exit polls or mytochondrial DNA.


Think about your term "any certainty" and what that means. That is a really key issue.


And so if you can only guarantee your exit polls with a probability of about 1%, then for one election in a 100 to be wrong is not surprizing.


That is imprecise terminology. If the "margin of error" is 1%, that means that about 95% of true proportions should fall within 1% of the predicted value. Thus, we would expect about 5 "wrong" (by more than 1%) out of 100, but none should be wrong by very much. With the Ohio data, the concern is that some of the predictions are wrong by a lot and in some unusual ways.


Current models of statistics seem unable to deal with events with "large tails in their probability distribution functions" - that is, an event that is unlikely, but when it does happen, it makes a huge difference. So, for example, with a genuine normal distribution, the chances of being off by 10 standard deviations is incredibly small that for all intents and purposes it just isn't going to happen. But you just need a few of these large tailed events skewing your data, that the chances of being off by 10 standard deviations is about the same as being off by 2 or 3 standard deviations.

And this is what I am thinking happened with the exit poll data.



(Incidently, I think that large tailed events are one of the problems with microarray analysis - an example of a large tailed event is that one of the microarray chips got a scratch. And from my brief reading of the microarray literature, this is a real consideration.)





(And the assumption that the elections are independent - now that surely is unreasonable.)


That depends on what things are assumed to be independent.

Mike

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